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Remember for the Future – The Mediterranean as a Memory Space 
by Ferdinand Richard2 
Bearing in mind that we are in Greece, I would like to put my thoughts under 
the auspices of two Greek words, “politiki”, which means politics, and “politis-
mos”, which means civilisation. I find this semantic similarity a good frame for 
my intervention.  
Our very rich debates over the last two days have provided me with some valid 
starting points.  
Let me point out a few of them: 
1. We are facing nothing less than the reinvention of a shared political space 
by refusing the dictatorship of nationalisms. 
2. We realize that the core clash in politics nowadays, not only in the Mediter-
ranean area, but all over the world, is about falsifying history. 
3. We must consider extended time, refuse to be dictated to by immediate 
urges, and search for long term multiple level solutions. This part of the 
world bears ample witness to the fact that quick solutions today may well 
result in long-lasting problems in the future. 
4. We acknowledge that the notion of a common ground is large, transversal, 
holistic, and flexible. It entails a constant up-hill battle. 
                                                          
2 Ferdinand Richard is the current president of the Roberto Cimetta Fund and attended the conference in this 
capacity. The Roberto Cimetta Fund is a civil society initiative, launched by arts and culture professionals 
more than 10 years ago, in order to support the mobility of artists and cultural activists between Europe, the 
Arab world and the Middle East. The members of its board and panel of experts come from the all parts of 
this area. The Fund has awarded more than 1500 travel grants over a 10-year period. In the past two years, a 
second programme, called Tamteen, has provided financial support to sustain 20 local teams of artists in the 
Arab World and the Middle East (including Yemen, Iraq, etc.). The Fund’s latest programme, Fil Manfa, 
aims at supporting three shelters/co-working spaces for approx. 40 artists/cultural operators in exile, in the 
neighbourghood of conflicts (Kurdistan, Beirut, Istanbul). 
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5. We are concerned with multiple spaces overlapping each other, and not al-
ways fitting the classic diplomatic neo-colonial approach of the so-called 
Mediterranean space.  
Based on this debate, and coming from the front line, I will try and express my 
thoughts about three long term trends: economic, political, and individual. 
The economic trends show a dramatic evolution; some of these trends merit 
more attention. 
1. Multilateral soft content industries will gradually replace heavy vertical in-
dustries. Large investment funds will progressively invest in these content 
industries, which may become the n°1 global assets over the next 50 years, 
when fossil energy will probably have disappeared. Providence Equity Fund, 
with almost 50 billion US-Dollars to invest in global content industries 
(among others, Warner is in their portfolio), is one of the many examples of 
these manoeuvres. These massive global players are already investigating 
the area we are looking at.  
2. Paradoxically however, interactive and agile networks of smaller knowledge 
industries will concentrate on sustainable industries beside what I call the 
gigantic military-industrial commercial empires. These smaller enterprises 
will facilitate intercultural dialogue. 
3. By its nature, mass consumption, of which mass tourism is one of the most 
visible manifestations in the Mediterranean area, in its aim to be efficient, is 
set on isolating the diverse categories of consumers / individuals as much as 
possible, up to an unhuman level. It is also a direct threat to intercultural 
dialogue. 
4. The need to organise transgenerational dialogue is coming back as a natural 
urgent obligation.  
5. The notion of ethical capitalism, immediately placed at the intersection of 
secularism and religion, remains marginal when facing the notion of max-
imised profits. Considering current global economic negotiations, it also still 
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remains largely an intellectual speculation. The absence of ethics in econ-
omy has an impact on the religious issue, including the most violent con-
flicts.  
6. Who are the guards of our ethics? The legitimate desire for intercultural di-
alogue forces us to reconsider the regulation of wild capitalism. Is ultraliber-
alism a genuine image of freedom? 
As for politics, some new developments should be stressed, instead of clinging 
to the usual clichés. 
1. Cultural zones of influence are gradually replacing national borders, for bet-
ter or for worse. 
2. While retaining an old-fashioned block-against-block strategy, traditional 
competition between nations is being replaced by an instrumentalisation of 
cultural differences, the so-called ‘clash of civilisations’, which in fact is 
only a new layer of make-up on the face of nationalism.  
3. After the collapse of the former colonial empires in this part of the world, 
some regional and religious powers, e.g. Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 
Israel, are attempting to fill the empty chairs, strengthen and build their own 
empires and gain influence – not to speak of the never-ending pressure from 
Russia, the US and the EU. Do these powers really consider intercultural 
dialogue as an essential tool for peace? Do they consider peace their main 
objective, or is expansion their first priority? 
4. Asia has always shown a particular interest in Africa and the Mediterranean 
area. The centre of the world which moved from the Mediterranean to the 
Atlantic, is now moving to the centre of the Pacific. Are the people in the 
Mediterranean area showing enough interest in Asia? Is the Marco Polo 
spirit belonging to the past?  
5. Is the Euro-Arab space interested in the rest of the world? Or is it too self-
centred on its own problems and its heritage? Does this area understand that 
the rest of the world is looking at it as a more-or-less single entity?  
   Europa Bottom-Up Nr. 18 
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6. Is this area interested in comparing itself with the other European ‘mare nos-
trum’, the Baltic Sea?   
Let me turn to the sphere of the individual. As we all know, no change can 
happen without the commitment of individuals, citizens, inhabitants. 
1. What we acknowledge today is not the withdrawal of the European idea, it 
is the painful beginning of a long-expected and positive transformation, in-
cluding the re-definition of the international relations of anyone of us – the 
single individuals living in Europe, including the re-balancing of yet another 
north / south unfair deal, the one which is internal, between southern and 
northern Europe, which is also affecting, through a domino effect, the Euro-
pean relations with the MENA region.  
2. Physical and virtual mobility, peer-to-peer transversality and universalism, 
must not lead to a one-way journey. Peer-to-peer may be considered an ex-
pression of democracy only if it respects the principles of fair trade.  
3. Golden triangles (Amsterdam / Paris / London) are the geographical bases 
of the empire. They assemble all the tools of power. They act as magnets on 
youth. Brain drain is their worst effect. It deprives local communities of their 
expensive investment in education. It keeps young creative people from par-
ticipating in the development and reconstruction of their regions and com-
munities. In the long term, this will keep fuelling the unbalanced situation, 
and its consequences: europhobia and xenophobia.  
4. Local development is at the base of fair relationships, and the individual is 
the engine of this development. Mobility is all about local development, not 
about people living in airports. It is about sharing with your friends at home 
the benefits of your journey.  
Teams from Barcelona and Glasgow Universities have recently conducted and 
are still conducting some highly important research on hybridisation, integra-
tion and /assimilation. The project is called ‘Cultural Base’.3 The project aims 
at finding answers to some age-old questions: ‘Who is integrating whom?’, 
                                                          
3 See http://culturalbase.eu for details 
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‘Who is assimilating whom?’, ‘What level of hybridisation is compatible with 
Cultural Diversity?’ 
I believe that with the help of technology the world will become an organic 
network of multiple peripheries. Peripheries must become centres again, espe-
cially in the Euro-Arab area. And whatever happens, the Europe of the young, 
including those of immigrant origin, is coming. The global union of youth is at 
work. All over the world, in a permanent move, it is creating a common lan-
guage – whether of good or bad quality, we cannot say, since it is linked to 
political dynamics.  
I do not speak exactly the same French as my father did, and my grandchildren 
do not speak French like I do. Culture is on a constant move. In one hundred 
years from now, what will remain of our present nations, of our current lan-
guages? Will heritage be part of nostalgia, or the fuel for the future? 
My conclusion is a quote from the Universal Declaration on the Human Rights4, 
which, being article 1, is generic to all other articles of this document, which 
has been ratified by most of the world’s nations. 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act  
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
What does it mean to be equal in dignity? It means there is no dominant culture. 
 
  
                                                          
4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 
10 December 1948 (General Assembly Resolution 217 A) 
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Colonization – The First European Development    
by Polyxeni Adam-Veleni  
The borderline from the 8th to the 7th century BC marked by three very important 
events which determined the course of Western civilization and greatly affect 
our lives today. The first was the invention of the Greek alphabet, the first pho-
netic alphabet in Europe where then came the Latin alphabet and the rest of 
European countries. The Greek alphabet emerged by adding vowels according 
to the Phoenician alphabet. The Greeks had close relations with the Phoenicians 
as early as the 12th century and taught them the art of navigation in the Mediter-
ranean. Phoenicians and Greeks: two seafaring peoples who left their marks on 
the Mediterranean routes. Their presence affected the fate of many other peoples 
and opened roads of trade and culture. The Phoenicians, with an older seafaring 
tradition, were the pioneers. They tamed the sea and taught the Greeks the way 
to master it. Soon, the Greeks became their main antagonistics in their maritime 
enterprises. They use this knowledge for several centuries to create a huge wave 
of colonization, much larger and ambitious than what we had tried their incom-
plete knowledge in the 12th century BC. 
The third important achievement was the invention of trading not with exchang-
ing products but buying goods with precious metals. First with iron spits at the 
end of the 8th century and immediately after the first coins, so it became much 
easier the transactions. The forerunners of the coinage were the iron obeloi 
found at the Heraion of Argos. Their established use as a coin attributed to Phei-
don King of Argos probably dates from the end of the 8th century. In the middle 
of the 7th century, or just after the first coins from electro, a special alloy of 
silver and gold were struck in Ionia at Lydia. Without doubt the subsequent 
development of coinage is due to that admirable capacity of the ancient Greek 
spirit.  
The Greeks at the end of the 8th century and early 7th have three very strong 
“weapons” to expand their territory. Common Greek alphabet with which they 
can have better communication between them, coinage which are easier for the 
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transactions and good knowledge of navigation. The narrow limits of the conti-
nental body, the aegean and ionian islands and the coast of Asia Minor is not 
enough for them: in the next two centuries, they will seek new fertile lands and 
new productive resources. The adventure of the second period of Greek coloni-
zation starts. Creating a colony of a city state was not simple matter. Most often 
this expedition had been preceded by several trips to find a suitable place and 
to reach to the proper conditions to create a colony. When it was to find a colony 
was never in a hurry. Usually they calculated everything down to the smallest 
detail. In which place, what region in Mediterranean coast, close to whom and 
what commercial benefits would have been, were their basic notions. Could 
they easily sell their products? Were local products that could trade them in their 
motherland? Existed available land for cultivation? And if so, could cultivate it 
without any local conflicts? These were fundamental questions that concerned 
them for long before deciding the establishment of the colony. But let us better 
see the procedure for founding a colony. 
It is indisputable that the foundation of a colony was a momentous event for a 
city-state in Mainland or Island Greece. Usually, it was the natural outcome of 
previous exploratory voyages in search of wealth-generating resources or the 
result of trading transactions between the mother-city (metropolis) and a distant 
land. The reasons for founding a colony varied: political, economic, social, de-
mographic and so on. The phenomenon of founding colonies became more 
widespread and systematic during the 8th century BC, when the Greeks suc-
ceeded in building better ships, capable of navigating in remote and inhospitable 
seas. Concurrently, the close contact between Greeks and Phoenicians and the 
growing competitiveness between the two seafaring peoples began to create the 
preconditions, and frequently the necessity, for more permanent residence in a 
far-off place. With their ships, the Greeks succeeded in taming the fiercest seas, 
anchoring in sheltered harbours at the outposts of the Mediterranean Sea, the 
Euxine Pontos and the African coasts, and creating new cities, many of which 
continued in existence for over three thousand years and are still lively today. 
In most cases the foundation of a colony was prepared in advance, by establish-
ing small installations or by operating local trading posts (emporia) in the terri-
tory earmarked for colonisation, several years before the final settling there of 
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a population from the metropolis. However, the ties of a city state with its col-
ony did not cease with its foundation. The metropolis continued to show interest 
in the colony and to exercise influence on it. Thus, the successful foundation of 
the city-colony was of multiple significance for the metropolis, which usually 
took care to maintain its political, economic and social ties with the newly-
founded daughter city. Information on the foundation of cities-colonies is drawn 
from the textual sources. However, these do not record sufficient details on the 
way in which the colonisation took place. Undoubtedly, this would be deter-
mined each time by different parameters related to the administrative organisa-
tion, the importance and the economic prosperity of the metropolis, as well as 
the conditions characteristic of the new land. Practical matters had to be solved, 
ranging from how the site for colonisation and the group of pioneer colonists 
would be chosen to how the public and private buildings in the new city would 
be constructed. It was the metropolis that had a supportive function with regard 
to economic, demographic and administrative issues, which is the reason why 
it sought, even if the colony it founded became powerful after some time, to 
have a say in its domestic affairs, so as to reap benefits from its colony’s pros-
perity. The appointed leader of the colonising mission, who was also considered 
founder of the city, was the oikistes. 
The oikistai were eminent figures in the society of a metropolis. Many cities 
honoured in perpetuity their oikistai, erecting heroa or imposing tomb monu-
ments and worshipping them with offerings and religious rites. The metropolis 
ceded to the oikistes absolute authority; he was autokrator, which meant that 
everyone who participated in the creation of a colonial city was obliged to obey 
his orders without objection. The ceding of this absolute authority to one person, 
the oikistes, seems quite reasonable, given that the host of people the metropolis 
decided to send to colonise a place was often motley, sometimes even coming 
from different city-states. Thus, only as autokrator could the oikistes cope with 
all the difficulties and issues that arose in the course of the venture. Other colo-
nists, always men, were appointed to support the principal oikistes, as well as 
specialists who contributed to the laying out and the initial organisation of the 
colony. Although the sources are rather vague on the matter, it seems logical to 
assume that this group was dispatched as an  
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advance reconnaissance party, preceding the rest of the potential inhabitants of 
a colony, in order to seek out the place, locate the most promising site and or-
ganise the life of the colony. The population of women, children and more el-
derly persons followed. The view that only men were involved in the colonisa-
tion and that they then married women from the local population does not seem 
to apply, except for some cases, as the sources preserve testimonies of priest-
esses who were moved to the colony after its foundation or of women who sped 
to be reunited with their husbands, together with the rest of the family, as soon 
as the settlement process had been completed. 
The principal oikistes and the other colonists were accompanied by geonomoi, 
who played a decisive role in selecting the site for building the city and in allo-
cating the land, as the successful foundation of the city depended primarily on 
its correct and precise measurement. Consequently, the foundation of the colony 
was related directly to the measurement and the distribution of land. After the 
main task of mapping the area where the various buildings of the colony were 
to be constructed, the architects played a significant role, defining the spaces 
intended for the public edifices, the necropoleis and the sanctuaries, and then 
designing the civic complexes and the private residences. With regard to the 
spatial planning of the sanctuaries, special attention was paid to delimiting the 
lots of agricultural land in their vicinity, from the leasing of which the expenses 
of the upkeep of the temenos were covered. Thus, if the oikistes was responsible 
for selecting the site, the geonomoi were responsible for measuring the land and 
allotting it justly to the colonists and the architects were entrusted with the spa-
tial planning of the city’s functions and the design of its public and private build-
ings. In some cities, where this process was not followed and no architects were 
employed, as for example in Akragas, problems, which are noted in some of the 
sources, arose in their orderly functioning. The simplest method of dividing up 
the land was into parallel zones, which, in their turn, could be easily allocated 
in smaller parts. Plots of equal size were the lots both in the cities and the rural 
territories, while, as one may assume from their name in the sources, kleroior 
meri, the parcels of land were distributed by drawing lots (klerose). The ques-
tion whether the distribution of lots was made on the basis of the principle of 
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equal share preoccupied at various times philosophers, such as Plato and, pri-
marily, Aristotle. Despite doubts expressed at times on the fairness of this sys-
tem of dividing and distributing the ground, the parcelling of the land into par-
allel zones, which ranged in size from 4 to 10 hectares, depending on the con-
figuration of the terrain, was kept throughout antiquity.  
The place of settlement was usually coastal and at low altitude. The colonists 
preferred to design the new cities-colonies on peninsulas, even if the ground 
space was limited. More rarely, they chose sites further inshore, in sheltered 
bays, or on plains in the hinterland, always on condition that there was easy and 
direct access to the coast. Proximity to the sea was the first and essential pre-
requisite, as in most cases, this was the main reason for founding each colony. 
If the ground at the chosen point was also slightly elevated, this was undoubt-
edly an important advantage, but it was not the decisive parameter for selecting 
the site. Otherwise, the city-colony was laid out on completely flat ground. The 
choice of laying out on flat ground and not on steep or high slopes was also a 
main difference from the sites that had been chosen for the metropoleis in Geo-
metric and Archaic Times. The size of the colonial cities varied and usually 
exceeded that of their metropoleis, which in the meantime had already ex-
panded. An average-size colony covered about 80 hectares but there were also 
larger cities of up to 200 hectares. In this mean area, some 4,000 to 5,000 houses 
could be arranged, which corresponded to an average population ranging from 
30,000 to 50,000 inhabitants. Of course, during their early years, the colonies 
had small populations of 200 to 1,000 persons and their demographic increase 
was gradual. The primary concern of each oikistes was to set the boundaries of 
the city by raising a strong fortification before anything else. The city walls 
followed the lie of the land and their construction was adapted accordingly. Intra 
muros, all the colonies were planned in parallel zones, between which building 
insulae were created. The width of the parallel zones varied from 29 to 35 me-
tres. Depending on the availability of space, the zones ran in the same or in a 
different direction. Frequently, as in the case of Selinous for instance, the direc-
tion of these zones was determined by two hills. The vertical streets, which de-
fined the length of the building insulae, were usually arranged at fixed intervals 
so that the insulae were of the same size. However, the scheme followed in each 
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case was different, because it was dependent on the space available each time. 
In accordance with the standards of the city-state, as these were first formulated 
in the Archaic Period and evolved in the Classical Period, the new city founded 
as a colony ought to have administrative autarky in the land in which it was 
established. Despite the fact that the concept of the city state must have existed 
from Classical Times onward, its urban model of function was formulated much 
earlier. Thus, for the orderly functioning of a city-state, a series of constant pa-
rameters was imposed: living space enclosed by fortification walls, laying out 
of a regular urban plan, temples and temene for the practice of worship, agora, 
theatre, gymnasium and private houses, sufficient area for cemeteries and land 
for cultivation (chora). 
In the colonies, as in the metropoleis, the spatial planning of the public functions 
of each city was of decisive significance. The nucleus of public life was the 
agora, where the official buildings of the administration stood, such as the pryta-
neion, the bouleuterion, some urban sanctuaries, public fountains and exedrae, 
the theatre and whatever else concerned the urban daily life of the citizens. The 
shops, private or public, depending on the merchandise, were also there or close 
by. The agora was usually situated in a position that ensured direct access to the 
harbour installations, for easier loading and unloading of cargoes. Sometimes 
the workshops producing various goods were arranged on the fringe of the agora 
or directly outside its walls and close to the seaward accesses. In some cities, 
such as Metapontion, which spread between two rivers and had abundant fertile 
land for cultivation, between the city and the fields, where scattered farm-steads 
were located, there was an intervening zone extra muros, 1,300 metres wide that 
was intended for the gardens and the necropolis. The agora was usually sur-
rounded by a system of horizontal and vertical street axes that also defined the 
building insulae with the private houses around it. Sometimes, a wide central 
street passed through its main axis. The earliest example of an organised agora 
of a colony is that at Megara Hyblaia in the second half of the 7th century BC, 
where the agora occupies a triangular space between streets running in different 
directions. In other cases, such as Akragas, which seems to have been one of 
the few cities planned without the input of an architect, the agora was simply an 
open space adjacent to the city walls. The houses ranged in size from 156 to 256 
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square metres. They were usually provided with a rectangular pastas (chamber) 
and an open internal courtyard, while one part of them was two-storeyed to ac-
commodate the quarters for the women and children. As the houses underwent 
many alterations over the years, it is difficult to discern their plan at the time of 
the colony’s foundation or whether they were initially single-space dwellings, 
as were the early houses at Megara Hyblaia in the 7th century BC, which imi-
tated in size and plan the known houses in the metropoleis of the same period. 
Later, the inhabitants of Megara Hyblaia enlarged their houses and, with the 
addition of collateral buildings, created a kind of internal courtyard. Due to the 
successive changes in family properties, which in the following generations 
may have involved the sharing of the same plot among siblings, it is difficult to 
determine exactly the way in which plots were divided. In most cases, the plots 
were protected on the street side by high yard walls. Usually the colonists pre-
ferred to build rooms in the north part of the plot and, in front of these, they 
constructed a semi-outdoor space (portico) or a half-roofed chamber (pastas), 
serving the needs of household chores, raising children and everyday living, 
which offered protection from the heat and the sun in the summer and was 
warmer in the winter. The creation of so many new settlements-colonies in var-
ious parts of the Mediterranean basin and the Black Sea (the Euxine Pontos) 
surely contributed the most to defining the parameters, systematising the meth-
ods, codifying the needs and programming conscientiously all the prerequisites 
for the ideally correct organisation of a settlement. It could be argued that the 
fact that the Greeks “were forced” to build all these hundreds of new “urban” 
centres, under different conditions each time, enriched their thinking about the 
needs of a city, was linked directly with the philosophical principles and theo-
ries of their time and led them to even more “scientific” applications and imple-
mentations of their urban planning and architectural designs. In other words, 
with the foundation of so many urban settlements everywhere, the know-how 
of urban planning and construction of the period developed to a remarkable de-
gree. It is not at all improbable that the famous “Hippodamean” system is owed 
to this accumulative evolutionary experience: devised by the great architect 
from Miletos, Hippodamus, this was considered as expressing, in the most real-
istic and applied manner, the basic principles of democracy.  
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As has been done, I hope, obviously, the creation of a colony in any part of the 
Mediterranean was a major factor in the development of the region. On the one 
hand, the local residents could sell their products and their productions, on the 
other, the colonists brought new consumer goods to the places that established 
the colonies. The acceptance of the establishment of a colony was not always 
peaceful. Several are the situations that the local residents have seen hostile to 
the presence of the colonists. However, even then, in the competition created, 
benefits have emerged. Most of the times, however, colonists saw the benefits 
of having a colony in their neighbourhood. After all, the settlers did not kill the 
locals to prevail. Instead, they were trying through diplomatic, negotiation and 
spiritual processes to disseminate the achievements of Greek civilization and to 
integrate within the newly established city those of the locals who wanted to 
join. Every city, apart from its walls, had a market where democratic decisions 
were taken all the decisions about the administration and all the commercial 
transactions took place. An essential component of everyday public life was the 
theatre, which was the most frequent place to gather for entertainment as well 
as for entertainment with the ancient Greek meaning i.e. for the education and 
the treatment of the soul. The Greek colonies in the Mediterranean do not know 
if they can easily be counted. Surely, they reach a much larger number than the 
one that has been identified and excavated to date. With a rough estimate far 
exceeds the number of 500 across the Mediterranean basin, but also on the Black 
Sea coast. Many of them are living settlements and cities to this day. These 
colonies were also the first bodies of culture and development across Europe. 
Through them, the habit of trading in currencies, traveling ideas, scientific and 
artistic achievements, and all sorts of goods from one end of Europe to the other 
spread. They have formed the foundation stone and model for basic principles 
of organization of cities and of democracy-based regimes for most of the later 
states of the Old Continent. 
With this in 2014 at the Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki we organized 
with the sponsorship of Alpha Bank, which also has one of the largest and most 
valued collections of coins in the world. 
The exhibition “The Europe of Greece: Colonies and coins from the Alpha Bank 
Collection” focused on Greek colonies of antiquity that are not located in Greek 
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territory but today belong to modern European states. The principal criterion for 
choosing the colonies presented were the coins of the Alpha Bank Numismatic 
Collection. In addition, and in order to give a fuller picture of certain representa-
tive colonies from countries of Southern Europe and the Black Sea, a small 
number of finds that largely define the identity of the colony was selected. At 
many of these ancient sites, there is continuity of life to this day, a further factor 
that defined the final choice. In some modern settlements or cities, influences 
or remains of the once flourishing Greek colony are still apparent in various 
aspects of their public and private life. 
Beyond the objects exhibits the exhibition and the accompanying catalogue aim 
to include in a panoramic overview almost all the Greek colonies in the Medi-
terranean and the Black Seas, through maps and abundant educational material 
kindly provided by the excavators / authors of the texts and the entries. In this 
way, the huge dispersion (diaspora) of Greeks to the ends of the then-known 
world becomes immediately apparent. The exhibition was constructed in two 
units in each gallery. The introductory unit in the first gallery outlines the role 
of the sea as vital force of Hellenic civilisation, the main myths, the epics and 
the emblematic heroes invented of basis of maritime adventures. The first unit 
in the same gallery, entitled “Colonisation: Adventure and Challenge. Identity 
and Nostos”, spotlights various facets of the phenomenon of colonisation, the 
historical, social and economic framework that secured the suitable conditions 
and, primarily, its correlation with the emergence of the city-state. 
In the second gallery, the unit “New Homelands from the Euxine Pontos to the 
Pillars of Heracles” deals with the geographical spread of the colonisation phe-
nomenon from south Italy, Southern France, Spain, the Illyrian Coasts and the 
Euxine Pontos. Thirty-nine colonies are presented, the most representative of 
the regions. Each colony is a separate microcosm and its own particular charac-
teristics and coinage are determined. Special weight is attached to the Greek 
alphabet and its dissemination, the adoption of new crops, the unification 
through coinage, the prevailing of Greek habits in daily life, such as the sympo-
sium, the cults and the theatre. 
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The next unit in the second gallery entitled “The Greeks and the Others” is de-
voted to the relations that developed between the Greeks and the neighbouring 
peoples in the regions where colonies were founded. Through this coexistence 
influences were generated, new cultural traits were introduced and therefore, 
cohabitation became possible, despite whatever differences and differentiations. 
Special mention is made of the Greeks relations with the seafarers and potential 
rivals, i.e. the Phoenicians, the Celts of Western and Eastern Europe and the 
Scythians of the Black Sea.  
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Commercial Roots  
by Vera Costantini   
In one of his articles, Carlo Dionisotti analyzed the literary topos of war in the 
East during the Renaissance. The eminent historian of Italian literature argued 
that limiting analysis to Venice would lead the interpretation to the core of the 
question, since the majority of literary examples on the topic were written and 
published in early-modern Venice. Understandably, its geographic location and 
its economic interests eastward led the Republic of Saint Mark, more than any 
other Italian or European state of the time to being deeply concerned by the 
perspective of a military confrontation with the Ottoman Empire. Should we 
shift the analysis from this Renaissance literary topos to the topic of the session 
I have the honour to open (European commercial roots), Venice may still legit-
imately retain a central role. 
In the tumultuous aftermath of the fall of the Roman Empire, when the areas in 
Europe excluded by the monetary economy were expanding, the newly founded 
Republic of Venice boasted its maritime and commercial eastward mission, dis-
playing an attachment to the Byzantine world and eventual affinities with any 
other political entity on the eastern Mediterranean. In 1082, commercial privi-
leges were granted by Emperor Alexios I Komnenos to the Venetian merchants 
in return for naval aid against the Normans. When possible, and in open oppo-
sition to the pontifical directives to fight “infidels” and “heretics”, the Venetian 
leading class did not refrain from establishing intense economic partnerships 
with the Byzantine and Muslim Orients. As stated by Fernand Braudel in “Civ-
ilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme”, exchange must be mutual: in the 
case of early Venetians, wood and slaves, coming from not-yet-Christianised 
populations such as the Slavs and Anglo-Saxon tribes, were the essential means 
of getting gold and silver from the Muslims, with which to buy from Constan-
tinople the luxury wares in demand in the West. “Their ready access to supplies 
of timber stimulated Venetian shipbuilding”, writes Frederick Lane. “Then, 
having their own ships and having acquired, through the sale of slaves to the 
Muslims, precious metal to use as capital, the Venetians took into their own 
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hands more and more of the trade between their lagoons and the imperial capital, 
Constantinople”.  
According to economic historians, the model of pre-modern Europe was char-
acterised by a constant struggle between dominant stagnation, depending on the 
structural limits of the agricultural sector, and marginal dynamism, represented 
by forces of growth, which might be structured in what Emmanuel Wallerstein 
called “feudal business economies”. The economic model of the Republic of 
Venice developed according to an integration between agricultural and timber 
supplies, industrial specialisation, investment and foreign trade. Since the pre-
modern economic system is also defined as the “wood civilisation”, due to the 
importance of wood as fuel and as a raw material for construction industries, 
the relative availability of timber from the Cansiglio and Cadore forests largely 
contributed to turning the Venetian model of development into a success story. 
Frederick Lane, again, writes that “[i]t was Venice’s superior supplies of timber 
which initially formed the basis for a division of labour between the people of 
the lagoons and distant Mediterranean shores more productive of wine, oil, and 
wheat”.  
Therefore, the first argument I would like to shed light upon is the fact that, as 
we learn from the Venetian case study, international maritime trade started in 
the middle ages not as a separate entity from mainstream rural economies, but 
as an attempt to integrate capital formation and mutual exchange in a coherent 
development model in which the availability and redistribution of energy re-
sources (slaves, food and timber) played a relevant role. 
Since limited demographical growth occurred and slavery was generally con-
fined to domestic services or highly specialized industrial production, as in the 
Mameluk sultanates, up to the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the migration of 
energy-saving technologies from China and Central Asia to Europe led to an 
incomparable plus-value to the trade routes developed by the Venetians, among 
others. Active both in the south-eastern Mediterranean and on the Black Sea, 
the Venetians traded in partnership with Syrian and Egyptian merchants and in 
close contact with the Turkic peoples who preceded and accompanied the emer-
gence of Ottoman power. The Ponto-Caspian region, which Fernand Braudel 
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indicates as one of the frontiers of the Mediterranean, was an area of intense 
cultural and technological mediation. Up until the end of the fourteenth century, 
the Genoese owned Caffa, in Crimea, whereas the Venetians were in Tana, at 
the outlet of the Don River, turning the Black Sea into a region of intense com-
mercial investment. Constantinople itself had become less important, though 
remaining crucial as a way station to the ports of the Black Sea. These, in turn, 
led to the Caspian region and from there, through the steppes, eastward to China, 
or southward to Tabriz, Persia and the spice bank India. Hence, the centuries-
long relationship between Ottomans and Venetians had been preceded by two 
centuries of acquaintance with “other Turks”, a wide spectrum of Turkic groups 
such as the Uzbeks and Çagatays, who by then had turned Muslim, though op-
posed to qızılbaş Safavid Persia. The Codex Cumanicus, a thirteenth-century 
trilingual glossary with words and idiomatic expressions in vernacular, Kipçak 
and Persian is still conserved in Venice’s Marciana library. The Republic of 
Venice experienced its Golden Age and established the main structures of its 
trade with the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean from the year 1000 up to the 
end of the thirteenth century, in a period when European civilisation was finally 
ready and more importantly eager to acquire technological knowledge from the 
Far East. 
A group of comparative historians from Stanford University have argued that 
the “great divergence”, a concept introduced in 2004 by Kenneth Pomeranz to 
describe the gap between eighteenth-century industrial Britain and the rest of 
the world, should be applied retrospectively to a first, medieval phase, called 
“the first great divergence”, defining the technological gap between China and 
Europe. Here comes the second argument I would like to highlight: certainly, a 
commercial network is a closed chain where purchases are determined by sales 
and vice versa: “l’échange se boucle sur lui-même”, writes Fernand Braudel. 
Nevertheless, like all events, medieval Mediterranean trade also took place in a 
specific context; the latter was the still unsettled result of profound economic 
and social changes which had occurred at the end of the classical period. I be-
lieve that the peculiarly transitional pattern of the pre-modern era provided the 
Venetian economic action with a role of relevant cultural importance in the 
making of what would become modern European civilisation. 
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Indeed, migration of technologies played, and somehow still plays, an important 
role in economic development and it is surely no coincidence that archaeologi-
cal remains of one of the most ancient wheels in the Italian peninsula, a tide-
mill, were discovered in the lagoon of Chioggia. Evidence of tide-mills were 
also found in ninth-century Venetian monastic settlements, such as the Francis-
can monastery currently housing the State Archives. Investing in sophisticated 
and expensive technologies such as mills remained a peculiar feature of Vene-
tian economic expansion. In a wheat-producing region like sixteenth-century 
Ottoman Morea, Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent bestowed timars, normally 
reserved as compensation for military service, to Venetian merchants, with the 
aim of co-financing the construction of mills. Similar events took place in Bos-
nia in the same period. Since timars were often collected in kind, basically the 
Sultan ceded a share of the harvest to Venetian wheat merchants in exchange 
for free infrastructural machinery, to the benefit of both traders and local inhab-
itants. This example allows me to introduce a third argument: the construction 
of a trade network implied the knowledge of rural landscapes and structures, 
leading to a regional specialisation potentially improving local profits and there-
fore living conditions. “Il y a circuit”, writes Fernand Braudel, implying that all 
the parties involved, although eventually unequal partners, found it convenient 
to come to terms with foreign investors. 
In order to illustrate more clearly this third argument, let’s look at this picture. 
It was taken from the top of Lekuresit Fortress, in Southern Albania / Northern 
Epirus. This fortress was built by the Ottomans in the mid-sixteenth century 
with the aim of controlling the movements of the Venetians from the shores of 
Corfu, at the extreme right of the picture, to Butrinto, located southward on the 
Albanian coast. Today an amazing archaeological site, in the sixteenth century 
Butrinto, was still subject to Venetian rule: formed around a natural coastal lake, 
it was the perfect location for fishing enclosures, which were called talyani in 
Byzantine Greek (and mahi dalyan in Ottoman). The French historian Maurice 
Aymard states that the Adriatic Sea could be controlled from its north-western 
extremity to its south-eastern mouth. His interpretation is confirmed by the Ve-
netian strategy to install colonies on the eastern rather than the western shore of 
the sea, in a long chain stretching from Istria to Southern Albania, occasionally 
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interrupted by Ottoman dominions. This strategic concern worked in tandem 
with the economic interest in its regional resources: salt works and fish enclo-
sures. The first, with the aim of developing international trade, the second, des-
tined for regional sale and consumption. Ruling Corfu alone would have re-
sulted in isolating the Venetians, who were more interested in establishing a 
regional system of exploitation, including other Ionian islands as well as a por-
tion of the mainland, however small it might be. Somehow, the south-eastern 
Adriatic had to be a projection of the north-western model, represented by Ven-
ice, its lagoon rich in resources, and its hinterland. In other words, it had to 
reflect the same pattern of anthropisation of the environment, characterised by 
a resource-optimising interaction between humans and nature. As a conse-
quence, Venetian rule contributed to shaping the landscapes of the Mediterra-
nean. History is never a matter of origins, argues Marc Bloch, and I am not 
attributing to the Venetians the invention of fish enclosures, terrace farming, or 
salt works. Obviously, these had all been established techniques since the clas-
sical period. What I would like to state is that from the late middle ages up until 
the eve of modernity, when the Byzantine Empire had disappeared and the Gen-
oese had retired from practising active trade, the Venetians and their counter-
part, the Ottomans, became the two main Mediterranean institutional entities, 
and, since the main topic is commercial roots, in spite or maybe because of their 
profound differences, they were the two principal players on the Mediterranean 
trade stage. After all, as I mentioned earlier, it is the principle of reciprocity, not 
of identity, that counts between trade partners. 
Ottoman conquests in the Mediterranean paved the way for the establishment 
of imperial administration in areas formerly dominated by the Byzantines, Gen-
oese, Mameluks, and Venetians. Generally, Ottoman rule did not result in struc-
tural changes in the management of rural landscapes. Moreover, former rulers 
were seldom the first foreign community to be accepted in the newly acquired 
territory. This had been the case of early Ottoman Cyprus, devastated by the 
recent war, where a community of Venetian traders from Aleppo settled soon 
after the peace treaty was signed in 1573. If structural changes occurred in the 
economic system, it was seldom in spite of and not due to Ottoman rule, as 
happened in Cyprus, where sugar quickly decayed due to the competition of the 
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New World plantations and certainly not due to the direct intervention of the 
central government. Ottoman documents from the Topkapı kitchens witness the 
presence of Cypriot sugar in the imperial court as early as in the first half of the 
sixteenth century and there would have been no reason to stop the production 
once the island had become an Ottoman province. The end of Cypriot sugar 
production after the 1571 conquest was due to the fact that in the 1580s and 
early 1590s the Ottoman markets had officially opened to the English and Dutch 
traders, who soon radically modified the consumption patterns of eastern Med-
iterranean society. Sugar, in particular, whose production costs had dropped 
since the introduction of cane plantations in the Caribbean, rapidly became a 
commodity of mass consumption, whereas in the past it was strictly reserved to 
élites and certainly not wasted as a sweetener.  
As Ruggiero Romano remarked, it was not the Mediterranean space in itself that 
had lost centrality in the eyes of the new leading economies, on the contrary: up 
to the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman space adequately suited the 
needs of English, Dutch and later French economic expansion. The institution 
of free ports proved functional to the interests of nations wishing to have the 
easiest and evidently cheapest access to raw materials necessary to feed their 
growing industrialisation process. Livorno and Izmir, previously marginal real-
ities in the respective institutional frameworks, in the seventeenth century un-
derwent a stunning demographic growth, due to the strategic importance of their 
free ports for the Levant Company. The Mediterranean remained and still is of 
central importance for the world economy. It was rather the capacity of the 
Mediterranean actors to determine their own choices and destinies to be pro-
gressively undermined by the flow of foreign capital and by the political pres-
sures exercised by foreign nations.  
The seventeenth-century Mediterranean starts being a contradictory space: a 
high intensity of investments and an increased flow of capitals corresponded to 
Mediterranean States and Empires having increasing difficulty in coping with 
industrial competition, as well as administrative and military tasks. A century 
known for structural economic crisis, the 1600s were at the same time years of 
metamorphic transformation, conceived as philosophical argument and icono-
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graphic theme. After all, crises do incubate change. A specter was haunting Eu-
rope – the specter of newness. New food commodities were being introduced to 
the Europeans’ consumption basket; The New Science, though fiercely opposed 
by the Catholic Church, was demolishing the scholastic interpretation of the 
universe as well as its very perception of the social role of culture and intellec-
tuals; new alliances were being promoted and new wars led to unprecedented 
scenarios in and beyond the Mediterranean.  
The historiography of seventeenth-century Ottoman and Venetian relationships 
has focused on the twenty-year war of Candia, when the Republic, though ulti-
mately losing the conflict, inaugurated a period of vigorous military actions, 
such as the block of the Dardanelles, and, later, the re-conquest of Morea. Due 
to the war, trade under the Venetian flag had to be formally interrupted. 
Certainly, the war of Candia was a traumatic event in the history of Venice. 
Nevertheless, I would like to step back to a few decades earlier: from the 1573 
peace agreement until the actual conflict of Candia broke out, merchants from 
the Ottoman Empire and Venetian subjects experienced a particularly fruitful 
period of commercial and economic cooperation. In correlation to the Venetian 
attempt to internationalise the Adriatic space, Ottoman Bosnia became the sce-
nario of an extraordinary season of exchange and investment. The project of the 
Scala di Spalato (the Split free-port project, also known as “the new port”), 
consisting in the duty-free passage to or from Venice, fulfilled the need to renew 
the Republic’s commercial policy though leaving untouched the traditionally 
mercantilist trait of the capital economy (basically, duties were paid only once, 
in Venice).  
I would like to stress this last issue in particular, partly because it is my current 
research topic, and partly because it shows that even in difficult economic times 
a state canfind a way to adapt to new circumstances coherently with its own 
development. Across the many centuries of its existence, the history of the Re-
public of Venice still reminds us Mediterraneans to be aware of the resources 
of our lands, to ensure that exchanges taking place in and among our countries 
are truly mutual, not to fall into identity traps or even more elusive clashes of 
civilisation.  
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The Mediterranean: The Meaning of the Sea  
by Bernd Thum  
Whoever is asked what he thinks about the Mediterranean as a memory space 
will immediately answer laconically with a question: Ah, Braudel? During and 
shortly after the Second World War, Fernand Braudel actually created the clas-
sic narrative of the Mediterranean: the Mediterranean as the cradle of civiliza-
tion and a space for constant exchange of goods, people and ideas. Even today 
– notwithstanding a potential risk to be used as a pretext for power politics – 
this story is still a good story, and it is also of use to all who wish to redefine 
the Euro-Mediterranean area as an area of multilateral action and joint respon-
sibility, with a shared history, a shared heritage as well as a shared development 
and a common future. The aim of this redefinition should be the consolidation 
of the area as a geopolitical entity of a new kind. This is a political task. A 
successful policy in this direction requires, in addition to leadership, ideas and 
reliability, to be aware of two basic conditions: 
1. the lasting sustainable, now intensifying densification of reciprocal relations 
in the Euro-Mediterranean area, creating new dynamic spatial entities, not-
withstanding existing political boundaries;  
2. the need of imagination, that is the need of a ‘meaning’, which can be created 
by facts, but even more by pictures and narratives. 
Fernand Braudel has also expressed his opinion with regard to the spatial extent 
of the Euro-Mediterranean area. The epochal migration across the Mediterra-
nean has opened our eyes to us. It reminded us of what we should have known 
for a long time, namely that not only Europe and the Southern as well as the 
Eastern Mediterranean belong to this area, but also Saharan and sub-Saharan 
Africa. Braudel has known this from the beginning: In the third volume of his 
famous and most influential work “La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen 
à l'époque de Philippe II” (1949)5 he refers to this as the Grande Méditerranée, 
                                                          
5 English edition: The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. New York: Har-
per and Row 1972/1973 
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the “Great Mediterranean”, which includes not only the countries bordering the 
Mediterranean, but also Transalpine Western and Northern Europe, the Eastern 
Mashriq and North Africa down to the Sahel zone. One can call this the ‘Wider 
Euro-Mediterranean Area’ or the ‘Euro-Afro-Mediterranean Area’ extending – 
as some like to say – “from the Niger to the North Cape, from Dublin to Da-
mascus”.6 
Politics is human work, and human work depends on a set of meanings. A useful 
archive of such meanings is the history of ideas as well as the history of law. 
The history teaches us that there is not one ‘meaning of the sea’ but there are 
many meanings. In this paper, I shall limit myself to the European history and 
to the history of international public law.7 In order to arrange the variety of 
meanings I shall discuss the ‘meaning of the sea’ in three pairs of opposites: 
1. Territoriality versus ‘maritime thinking’,  
2. Civilizing regulation versus break and innovation, 
3. Traditional territorial state power versus maritime functional organization. 
Let me point out that I am speaking here of poles, not of antinomies. In each 
individual case, in each situation, the ‘meaning’ lies somewhere in between the 
poles. Because this conference is not just about remembrance but also about the 
future, I will try to find, in between the poles, the meaning which could serve 
as a guide for the future. The sea, what can it teach us through its meanings? 
I come to the first polarity: 
1. Territoriality versus ‘maritime thinking’ 
In 1993 Michel Mollat du Jourdin has published a beautiful book about Europe 
and its relationship with the sea. In this book, he stresses the “strong maritime 
                                                          
6 This is the motto of the Stiftung Wissensraum Europa-Mittelmeer (WEM) (Foundation Euro-Mediterra-
nean Knowledge Space/ WEM), Stuttgart and Heidelberg. The author is president of this foundation 
(www.wissensraum-mittelmeer.org). 
7 As to the meanings of the sea in Muslim societies see Jenny Rahel Oesterle: Arabische Darstellungen des 
Mittelmeers in Historiographie und Kartographie. In: Michael Borgolte und Nikolas Jaspert (eds.), Mariti-
mes Mittelalter. Meere als Kommunikationsräume. Ostfildern: Thorbecke 2016, 149-180 (with further lite-
rature). 
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bond” of Europe.8 For him land and sea belong together. Linking Europe’s re-
lationship with the sea to the Euro-Afro-Mediterranean area, he returns to 
Braudel’s concept of the Grande Méditerranée. Like Braudel he treats the great, 
south-facing peninsulas of Europe, namely Spain, Italy, Greece, as the “first 
actors of history.” For him they are “roads towards Africa”.9 Reversely, so 
Mollat Du Jourdin, the Southern Mediterranean is closely linked to the transal-
pine central and northern Europe. In Venice and Genoa, the Mediterranean Sea 
reaches out to the foot of the Alps. From there, the most important trade routes 
went and still go to the north, to the ports of the Atlantic, the North Sea and the 
Baltic Sea. Trade routes create a network of mobility across Europe, which also 
covers the southern and eastern Mediterranean and reaches into the Sub-Saharan 
zone. Goods, technology and people were and still are on the way on these trans-
continental Euro-Afro-Mediterranean routes. 
Today the intricate unity of the Euro-Afro-Mediterranean area results from the 
factors economy and technology, politics, migration, security, as well as from a 
partly common history, a partly common cultural heritage, a partly common 
education. It is a complex unity. For Braudel, too, the Mediterranean is an “in-
tersection of different worlds”10. For him, a characteristic feature of the Medi-
terranean is the linkage of the disparate. With many other historical examples, 
he mentions the crews of Moorish pirate ships from the ports of North Africa 
manned by Europeans, former Christians. These Arab-Berber ships came all the 
way to the North Sea and Iceland. According to Braudel, the ‘Great Mediterra-
nean’ requires imagination to be understood as a unity. The difficult unity of 
this area does not only involve common developments and common interests, 
it also includes conflicts. Maritime openness meets territorial strictness. 
                                                          
8 German edition:  Michel Mollat Du Jourdin: Europa und das Meer. München: C.H.Beck 1993, 20. French 
edition : L’Europe et la mer. Paris: Editions du Seuil 1993. English edition: Europe and the Sea. Oxford UK 
& Cambridge USA: Blackwell 1993. 
9 Mollat Du Jourdin, see note 6., 27. 
10 Fernand Braudel: Mediterrane Welt. In: Fernand Braudel, Georges Duby, Maurice Aymard, Die Welt des 
Mittelmeeres. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 1987/2006, 8. French edition: La Méditerranée. L’espace et l’his-
toire, les hommes et l‘héritage. Paris: Flammarion 1986. 
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A lot of imagination is needed to understand the massive migration across the 
Mediterranean Sea with its cruel negative implications as an element of a com-
mon Euro-Afro-Mediterranean space. The sad images of African migrants at 
sea, do not show them clearly that there are hard limitations between South and 
North? Yes, there are many, but these images are also signs of a current histor-
ical turn. States and societies in Europe, in the Southern and Eastern Mediterra-
nean as well as in Africa will see themselves compelled to abandon a purely 
continental, purely territorial view, characterized by clearly defined areas and 
linear boundaries. Instead, they will learn to think maritime, ‘maritime’ under-
stood in a metaphorical sense. Their thinking, acting, planning will no longer 
stay based exclusively on territories and fixed borders. Without abandoning 
state order – that is to say a monopoly on the use of force and legal protection – 
they will develop a new model for living-together, inspired and shaped by ‘mar-
itime’ thinking. It will be like shipping on the high seas, characterized by an 
almost unlimited mobility, high density of relations, close mutual dependencies, 
shared knowledge, shared responsibility for safety and law, persistent dyna-
mism through constantly redefining the own position in relation to other navi-
gators as well as the firm land. ‘Maritime’ acting and thinking corresponds to 
the structural model of ‘functional space’. A functional space is formed by a 
dense, dynamic and complex web of relationships, not by territorial demarca-
tion. The term is used by geographers and economists. I am trying to adapt it to 
a multilateral collaborative geopolicy,11 cooperating with colleagues like 
Yamina Bettahar12, participant at this conference. 
A new, ‘maritime’ thinking, is it desirable, is it necessary? Let us take a glance 
at the European history of ideas. In the early 18th century the Neapolitan scholar 
Giambattista Vico presented a great cultural theory. Part of his philosophical-
                                                          
11 Bernd Thum : Eine Geopolitik funktionaler Räume. Der erweiterte Mittelmeerraum als Beispiel. In : 
WIKA-Report 2 (2014), S. 17-35 (Online: http://wissensraum-mittelmeer.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/WIKA-Report_2-
2014_Sonderdruck_Bernd_Thum_Geopolitik_funktionaler_Raeume.pdf)– Bernd Thum: From the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership towards a Geopolicy of the Wider Euro-Mediterranean Area as a 'Functional 
Space' . In: Europa bottom-up Nr. 12. Berlin: Maecenata-Stiftung 2015 (online: http://wissensraum-
mittelmeer.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Geopolicy_EuroMed_Functional_Space.pdf) 
12 Yamina Bettahar, Bernd Thum: Introduction. In: Y.B. and B.T. (eds.): Circulations et échanges dans l’es-
pace euro-méditerranéen (XVII-XXI siècles). Paris: Editions Kimé 2016, 5-6 (= Philosophia Scientiae 
2016/2) (online: http://www.cairn.info/revue-philosophia-scientiae-2016-2-page-5.htm) 
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historical work, his remarkable Scienza Nuova, is a history of culture.13 In this 
historical work Vico lets start cultural development with the commitment of 
people to the sea and to seafaring. For this Mediterranean thinker, the sea was a 
decisive factor in the creation of law, of development, enlightenment, and even 
secularization. The archaic peoples of the interior are seen by Vico as isolated, 
inaccessible, xenophobic. He speaks of an “inlandish” mentality. From this ‘in-
landish’, territorially fixed mentality – in contrast to a mind marked by the sea 
– derives a spiritual and intellectual limitation, “because they [the archaic peo-
ples] in the darkness of their closeness, without intercourse with other peoples, 
did not see the true light of the times”.14 For Vico the city of Alexandria was an 
outstanding place of philosophy and science. He emphasizes that it was 
“founded by the sea”, “connecting African acumen and ingenuity with Greek 
delicacy”.15 
But that is enough on the topic of territoriality and ‘maritime thinking’ right 
now. Now let us turn to the two other polarities marking ‘the meaning of the 
sea’. At first: ‘Civilizing regulation versus break and innovation.’ After that: 
‘Traditional territorial state power versus maritime functional organization’. 
2. Civilizing regulation versus break and innovation 
We call ‘civilization’ the firm, sanctioned order controlling the living-together 
of individuals, groups and societies, characterized by calculability and suppres-
sion of acting predominantly driven by instincts. At this point we do not speak 
of one particular civilization among others – for this we prefer the term ‘culture’ 
– but of a specific ‘civilized’ form of social and individual living which is uni-
versally valid. 
In terms of civilization, the sea is a particularly interesting space. This space is 
fluid in the literal and in the transposed sense. The liquid, the incalculable is 
only imperfectly contained by the legal principle of the “freedom of the high 
                                                          
13 Giambattista Vico : Principj di una Scienza Nuova d'intorno alla commune Natura delle Nazioni. Naples 
1725-1744. German edition: Giovanni Battista Vico: Prinzipien einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemein-
same Natur der Völker. 2 Teilbände. Hamburg: Meiner 1990. 
14 Vico, see note 11, paragraph 83. 
15 Vico, see note 11, paragraph 46. 
   Europa Bottom-Up Nr. 18 
 
   33 
seas” and by the definition of “territorial waters”, that means the three to twelve-
mile zone.  Both concepts are civilizing regulations. Both stand for the civiliza-
tional dimension of the sea. However, the high seas are a space of high contin-
gency. Much is possible there, because not every situation is legally regulated. 
Michel Foucault, the French cultural philosopher, has called certain places ‘het-
erotopias’ or ‘heterotopes’. That is to say, ‘counter-places’ or ‘counter-spaces’, 
where the considerations, the calculations of everyday life are little or nothing. 
These are places which also escape the usual social judgings and valuations. 
That is why they represent a challenge for other places and spaces. Not infre-
quently, they are at the same time places of remembrance where bad things have 
happened, massacres, violence. Foucault argues that heterotopes are often re-
lated to transitions, upheavals, to an unexpected change which is understood as 
a danger. So, the Mediterranean Sea and its shores should not be seen stereo-
typically and exclusively as the ‘cradle of civilization’. It can also be seen as a 
counter-place calling into question civilization in the sense of social order and 
calculable living-together.  
The sea offers numerous natural, historical and current examples of this. There 
are huge storms that have destroyed entire fleets. There are the pirates. There 
are the interventions of foreign powers coming across the sea. There are flight 
and unregulated migration across the Mediterranean Sea. Aggression, flight and 
migration across the sea are old phenomena. So, they have got a mythical char-
acter in antiquity. Let us think of the flight of the Phoenician queen Dido to 
North Africa, Jason’s robbery of the Golden Fleece, the maritime assault on 
Troy, the flight of the Trojan Aeneas to Italy, which, however, finally led to the 
founding of Rome, which became a mighty agent of civilization. 
At sea, how can civilization arise there? Certainly by means of state agreements 
such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982/1994) or 
by the transfer of territorial style action to the sea, such as the confinement of 
large parts of the Mediterranean Sea, which was once attempted by Spain and 
Portugal, partly also by England. But all this is very unstable. More important 
for the making and safeguarding of civilization is the fine network of functional 
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relations, which arises across and over the sea forming tight meshes. With re-
gard to the Mediterranean one has to mention the following links: trade, mobil-
ity and migration, the exchange of ideas and concepts in culture, business and 
politics – all this now massively promoted by IT – furthermore, political inter-
actions and conflicts, ecological problems as well as cooperation. These are im-
portant potentials of civilization. 
However, there remain very serious challenges. The Mediterranean Sea remains 
dangerous. So, can a lack of civilizing regulations lead – seemingly paradoxi-
cally – to new innovative political, social, cultural, legal orders? There are rea-
sons to be optimistic. These reasons are partly timeless. Let us listen to a thinker 
of the European Middle Ages, more precisely, of the ninth century, Johannes 
Scottus Eriugena. Eriugena lived at the court of a Franconian king, a descendant 
of Charlemagne. He was born in Ireland and was deeply influenced by the Med-
iterranean spirit of Greek antiquity. For him, the sea is not just a source of 
knowledge and inventiveness as Giambattista Vico said 900 years later, for 
Eriugena, even more dynamic, it is at sea, that reason can freely unfold itself.16 
There is yet another argument for optimism: the importance of the sea for im-
agination. Vico thought to have discovered the origins of the ancient myths in 
the real experiences made by people at sea and on sea coasts. The Winged Horse 
of the myth of Perseus may serve as an example. For Vico this horse is the 
mythical transformation of a pirate ship with inflated sails. So, the bull of Minos 
is, likewise, the mythical transformation of an ancient pirate ship with a spur 
and Mediterranean rigging with horny Latin sails. The labyrinth of Minos is the 
mythical image of the confusing Aegean island world. Vico refers to a “poetical 
geography” of the sea.17 Often it is fantasy, imagination, which draws people 
out to the sea and to distant coasts. A ‘poetical’ geography, an inspired political 
cultural geography, is it still possible today? What about the creation of a Euro-
Afro-Mediterranean area, redefined as a functional space of common develop-
ment, shared prosperity, inspired by the overwhelming epochal experiences of 
                                                          
16 Mollat Du Jourdin, see note 6, 63 
17 Vico, see note 11, paragraph 741 (“poetical geography“), see also 634-636.  
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people at and around the Mediterranean Sea in our current times? A new aware-
ness may emerge from these experiences. New awareness then allows and cre-
ates new solutions. 
The sea, understood as a heterotope, has two sides: On the one hand the lack or 
the breaking of laws and civilizing rules, yes even destruction, on the other side 
new orders. Vico calls King Minos of Crete the “first lawmaker of the pagan 
peoples and the first corsair in the Aegean”.18 The flight of Aeneas from the 
burning Troy finally led to the founding of Rome and a new world order. 
I come now to the third polarity: 
3. Traditional territorial state power versus maritime functional  
organization 
Civilization should find its form in law, also in the law regulating the relation-
ship between states. This law is called international public law. The sea is of 
great importance for the development and safeguarding of this law. From the 
beginning of our historical memory, the Mediterranean was a high-risk zone, 
but it was not lawless. The maritime law owes itself to maritime trade, also to 
the millennium-old Mediterranean trade, understood as free exchange of goods 
which had to be protected by rules and sanctions. The Law of the Sea, in turn, 
is one of the roots of international public law. The United Nations Convention 
on Law of the Sea (from 1982 and 1994)19 is based on the principle of the “free-
dom of the high seas” (article 87) designating the states as responsible actors. 
The Convention specifies in article 87 (1): “The high seas are open to all states, 
whether coastal or land-locked”. The freedom of the high seas according to the 
Convention covers many freedoms, from the freedom of navigation to the free-
dom of fishing and scientific research, and even the freedom to “construct arti-
ficial islands”.  
On the one hand, the principle of the Free Sea, the Mare Liberum, goes back to 
centuries of efforts to prevent the unrestrained rule and violence of states at sea, 
                                                          
18 Vico: see note 11., Chronological display. Annexe to vol.1. 
19 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Online: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_ag-
reements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 
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driven by traditional territorial thinking. The principle of the Mare Liberum is 
aimed at the states which, according to the principle of the ‘Closed Sea’, the 
Mare Clausum, wanted to divide up the sea amongst themselves. These states 
wanted to transfer rules of territorial law to the sea. However, this has never 
worked. On the other hand, the principle of the freedom of the high seas, since 
antiquity, is aimed at the pirates. The pirates embody the total negation of every 
state order. They represent all potentials of maritime seafaring, which are di-
rected against state order. State power built up not least through the fight against 
piracy. This fight requires great resources, complex organization and the ability 
to create formal alliances. Attacks on the freedom of the high seas must be “re-
pressed” by all states in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, article 100 (et seq.): “Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy”: “All 
States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy 
on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” This 
is a very modern multilateral concept of security. Security this way is not to be 
guaranteed by one powerful actor, for example a world power, but by a multi-
tude of actors communicating and taking on specific functional tasks. 
Sea power is something fundamentally different from land power. Land power 
aims at mastering territories, sea power aims at the control of connections. The 
founder of the classical doctrine of naval power is the American admiral Alfred 
Thayer Mahan. In 1890, he published his famous book “The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History. 1660-1783”.20 For Mahan a large-scale trading network as 
well as naval bases are the “pillars” of naval power. As a basic “condition” for 
naval power Mahan regards maritime thinking, penetrating the entire attitude to 
life. For Mahan, maritime thinking is a specific mentality rather than a particular 
policy. Part of this mentality is the renunciation of power over coherent territo-
ries, the renouncement of clearly defined linear boundaries as well as the com-
prehensive regulation of social life in a dominated territory. Part of this mental-
ity is also the ability to think in categories of movement and changing constel-
lations as well as the interest to gain power not over land, but over the brains, 
                                                          
20 Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Influence of Sea Power upon History. 1660-1783. Boston: Little, Brown & 
Co, New York 1890, see in particular chapter I, 25-89 (online: http://www.guten-
berg.org/files/13529/13529-h/13529-h.htm) 
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to create “colonies”, ‘colonies’ in the sense of interested and friendly groups as 
political social foothold, human capital at disposal, while always maintaining 
the aim to control the exchange of goods, people and ideas.  
4. What should we do? 
Thomas Hobbes, the political thinker at the time of the European religious wars 
in the 17th century, is the father of the ‘Leviathan’. Using this monster from the 
Bible he describes the modern secular state in Europe. According to Hobbes the 
central task of this state is peace enforcement and peace keeping in large coher-
ent territories. The state has to keep the opposing social forces or parties under 
control, in particular the parties which legitimate themselves through religion. 
The sea, however, which cannot be controlled totally, was perceived by Hobbes 
as a threat, a threat to the peace which has to be created and maintained by the 
state (or the states). 
Even today many people perceive the sea, especially the Mediterranean Sea, as 
a potential threat. Classical piracy is no longer present there. But there are other 
challenges: There are violent interventions by larger and smaller states which 
do not adhere to operating civilizational standards, states which act ruthlessly, 
disregarding the rules of international law. Furthermore, there are cruel actions 
by extremists who do not obey any law that can be accepted by all. And there is 
finally the massive unregulated, mostly illegal migration, organized by private 
entrepreneurs acting on a large scale. All this is coming at a time when state 
order, not only in Europe, but also in the Maghreb and in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean is at risk or has even gone. All this is endangering also peace: peace 
between groups of different forms of life, different religions, different ethnici-
ties, different prosperity. The Leviathan is losing power. Whom or what could 
we put on his place? 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a new legal system was introduced 
in Europe: On the land a public law, which subjected all members of a society 
to a common legal system, at sea an international public law, in the form of the 
‘freedom of the high seas’. Today, too, there is a need of designing new orders 
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fitting to our world. The new orders should connect the safety of territorial or-
ganization with maritime flexibility, state order with functionality, territoriality 
with mobility, regulation with innovation. 
Let us return to the Mediterranean: the Mediterranean – sea and land – was and 
is a meaningful heterotope, meaningful, because proceeding from this hetero-
tope the world can be re-examined.21 The sea is a heterotope of movement. They 
were men of the Mediterranean, who travelled to distant continents: Pytheas of 
Massalia, Marco Polo, Columbus, Amerigo Vespucci, the Portuguese naviga-
tors. Other men, from the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea or from Al-
Andalus, have to be added: Hanno the Navigator from Carthage, Ibn Jubayr 
from Valencia (Balansyya), Ibn Battuta from Tangier, al-Idrisi from Ceuta, Ibn 
Khaldun from Tunis and many others. As mentioned above, the sea, according 
to the Carolingian thinker Eriugena of the ninth century, is a place where reason 
can freely unfold. The old maps, however, the mythical stories of charming is-
lands show: The sea is also a heterotope of imagination, of the dream to start to 
a new order. In the Mediterranean, understood as the Grande Méditerranée, the 
“Great Mediterranean”, this order should be – notwithstanding other ties and 
loyalties – the Euro-Afro-Mediterranean Area as a political, economic and even 
cultural entity of a new kind, an area of common prosperity, free mobility reg-
ulated by law, shared security, to sum up: a functional space “from the Niger to 
the North Cape, from Dublin to Damascus”.22  
  
                                                          
21 In 2012 the German political scientist Claus Leggewie published a book, which tried to redefine Europe's 
relationship with the Arab world. Its title is "The Future is in the South. How the Union for the Mediterra-
nean can revive Europe " (C.L.: Zukunft im Süden. Wie die Mittelmeerunion Europa wiederbeleben kann. 
Hamburg: edition Körber-Stiftung 2012). 
22 The author does not consider this scenario to be totally utopistic. Individual elements have already been 
proposed by renowned think-tanks such as EuroMeSco, the Euro-Mediterranean Study commission (see 
note 9). There are also state initiatives being on their way, such as the EU's Southern Neighborhood Policy, 
the Africa-EU Partnership or the program Compact with Africa. Cooperation in a true spirit of togetherness 
and belonging would enhance the value of these initiatives.  
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Politics and Religion in the Mediterranean: A Historical Approach  
By Murat Çizakça  
Christianity and Islam, the two religions dominating both shores of the Medi-
terranean, have always had a problematic symbiosis, sometimes mutually ad-
vantageous, sometimes hostile. This symbiosis was characterized by cross-cul-
tural borrowing of ideas and institutions. Looking at this process, first, from the 
perspective of religious principles, we note a remarkable borrowing of ideas 
during the early sixteenth century, the era of reformation in Europe. Probably 
as an outcome of this borrowing, Islam and Protestantism ended up having the 
following ideas in common: justification through faith, priesthood of the be-
liever, primacy of the scripture and iconoclasm.  
Martin Luther had said that the tower experience occurred when he was study-
ing the Bible, more specifically, Romans 1:17. But we also know that he had 
read the Qur’an and even wrote the preface to the so-called Bibliander Qur’an. 
So, we have here a very interesting mystery, was he influenced by the Qur’an 
and yet, naturally, never acknowledged it? 
Moreover, if the two religions have these important principles in common, why 
is there so much hostility that we observe today? It is well-known that in the 
same period Ottomans provided crucial help to Protestant England and Holland 
in their struggles against Catholic Spain.23 Most historians argue that this was 
just sixteenth century Realpolitik. But, could it be that Muslim Ottomans, in 
addition to the Realpolitik perspective, might also have considered Lutheranism 
a “better” form of Christianity? In view of the common principles between the 
two religions just mentioned, this is certainly a possibility. 
As for the institutions, Medieval Muslims developed three major institutions 
which, Europeans borrowed: 
                                                          
23 Murat Çizakça, “The Ottoman Government and Economic Life: Taxation, Public Finance, and Trade 
Controls”, in S. Faroqhi and K. Fleet (eds.), The Cambridge History of Turkey, 1453-1603, vol. II (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 243. 
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1. Business partnerships. The commenda partnership, known in the Islamic 
world as mudaraba or Qirad, was most probably borrowed during the tenth 
century by Italian merchants. The borrowing of this partnership and its in-
corporation into the Lex Mercatoria paved the way to the thirteenth century 
European commercial revolution. This particular partnership, so essential for 
financing an entrepreneur, was learnt by Italian merchants doing business in 
the Middle East. It then became a mercantile custom among them and was 
eventually incorporated into the various compilations of Lex Mercatoria, 
which facilitated the diffusion of mudaraba in Europe, where it came to be 
known as commenda. It is generally agreed that commenda was the most 
important business partnership of medieval Europe.24 Actually, medieval 
Europe was not the furthest limit of mudaraba’s geographical expansion. It 
was also observed in Central and South-East Asia, the Ming Dynasty China 
and even in fourteenth-fifteenth century Japan.25 Remarkably, this Eastward 
diffusion helped the Dutch when they reached the Indonesian archipelago 
for the first time. Reporting back home, servants of the Dutch East India 
Company, VOC, wrote that they found it very easy to do business with the 
“natives” since they knew and practiced commenda.26 In short, the Islamic 
                                                          
24 On the debate about the origins of the commenda, its vast importance and universal application, see; Av-
ram Udovitch, Profit and Partnership in Medieval Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Mu-
rat Cizakca, Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Rosalind K. Berlow, 
“The Sailing of the St. Esprit”, The Journal of Economic History, vol. XXXIX, 1979, No. 2, pp. 345-362; 
Ron Harris, “The Institutional Dynamics of Early Modern Eurasian Trade”, paper submitted at the confer-
ence: Economic Performance of Civilizations, Roles of Culture, Religion and the Law, USC, Feb. 23-24, 
2007. 
25 On the expansion to Central and South-East Asia see; M. Cizakca, Comparative Evolution of Business 
Partnerships (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 18-21. The expansion to China and Japan was explained to me by David 
Faure, Francois Gipouloux, Billy K. L. So and Deng Kent, during the Paris (EHESS) conference on Novem-
ber 29-30, 2013 sponsored by (CNRS), Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, the Maison des Sci-
ences de l’Homme and the Pôle de Recherche et d’Enseingement Supérieur HéSam.I am grateful to all these 
colleagues. The Chinese mudaraba/commenda differed from the usual European one in that the passive part-
ner was the Chinese state, which financed the ships. This was, however, similar to the original Middle East-
ern mudaraba, where tax revenues from provinces were transferred to the center in the form of mudaraba, 
i.e., the state, again, was the passive partner and the tax collector or the governor of the province, the active 
agent. 
26 J. C. Van Leur, Eenige Beschouwingen Betreffende den Ouden Aziatischen Handel (Middelburgh, 1934), 
p. 117; Gustav Schmoller, “Die Geschichtliche Entwicklung der Unternehmung”, Jahrbuch für Gesetzge-
bung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich (Berlin: 1890-91), Band XIV. 
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mudaraba had become a common link facilitating trade between the Euro-
peans and the Muslims of the Malay world at the edge of the Pacific Ocean.27 
2. The Law of maritime trade.28 International trade would not have been possi-
ble without a sophisticated maritime law. A well-known French historian 
Daniel Panzac has shown that this institution was also provided by Muslims. 
This originally Islamic law of maritime trade was transferred to Europe, 
again, through various compilations. The three most important compilations 
were made during the eleventh-twelfth centuries. These were the Maritime 
Laws of Rhodes, Oleron and the Consolato del Mare. Thanks to Panzac’s 
work, it is now definitively established that the first one, previously consid-
ered to be a derivative of the Roman-Byzantine digests, was in fact based on 
Al-Mudawwana al-Kubra by Sahnun Ibn Sa’id al Tanukhi (d. 854). It was 
commented upon by Ibn Rushd (known in the West as Averroes d. 1117) 
and drafted in Sicily or Southern Italy, both Muslim territories during the 
ninth to eleventh centuries. The second was authored by the Court of the 
Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem in order to harmonize trade relations be-
tween the occidental and oriental Christians as well as Muslims. This com-
pilation was brought to Europe partly by Eleanor of Aquitaine and partly by 
her son Richard the Lionheart. The contents of the Oleron compilation are 
identical to the Muslim laws of the ninth to tenth centuries. Finally, the Con-
solato del Mare was written in Spain. The document originates in the Mus-
lim Middle Eastern texts of the eighth to ninth centuries and was later 
brought to Andalusia. It was translated during the reign of King Alphonse in 
thirteenth century Castille as part of the great works of translation from Ar-
abic.  
                                                          
27 Professor Meilink-Roelofsz had suggested that Malay peoples might have learnt the commenda partner-
ship from the Portuguese. This view is no longer acceptable. Thanks to Fang’s work, we now know that Un-
dang-undang Melaka, a compilation of Islamic maritime law of Malacca was initiated by Sultan Muham-
mad Shah (1424-44) and completed during the reign of Sultan Muzaffar Shah (1445-58), some 40 years be-
fore the Portuguese ever set foot in the Indian Ocean. See, Liaw Yock Fang, Undang-Undang Melaka (The 
Laws of Melaka), (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 38. 
28 Hassan S. Khalilieh, Admiralty and Maritime Laws in the Mediterranean Sea (Leiden: Brill, 2006). See, 
particularly, Daniel Panzac, ‘Le Contrat d’Affrement maritime en Mediterranée”, Journal of the Economic 
and Social History of the Orient, 2002, vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 351-8. 
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3. There is strong evidence that waqf too was borrowed by the Europeans. 
Thus, important institutions of education and health, the two most crucial 
elements of human capital, were created in Europe after the Islamic pattern.29 
But borrowing was not one-sided. Muslims too borrowed ideas and institutions 
from the West: 
1. Foremost among these with the most dramatic consequences was national-
ism, which destroyed the traditional political set up of the Middle East. Na-
tionalism first split and then reduced multinational and multi-denomina-
tional empires into warring states, a process still affecting the region. The 
idea was invented by the Europeans, particularly the French, during the 
eighteenth century. It was then used in order to destroy the multinational 
Ottoman and Austria-Hungarian empires. But then, like a monster, it re-
turned onto its creators and having destroyed Europe twice during the twen-
tieth century, it now seems to be re-emerging, like a vicious phoenix, from 
its ashes in Europe. This is despite the proclamations of Mitterrand and Kohl: 
“le nationalisme c’est la Guerre” and “Nationalismus bedeutet Krieg”. It is 
precisely for these historical reasons that Macron’s recent election victory in 
France is so important. 
2. Technology. This was obviously positive and does not need further explana-
tion. 
3. Secularism (radical French secularism undermined the traditional Islamic 
secularism and led to still ongoing conflicts between the secularists and con-
servatives in many Muslim countries)30  
4. Socialism was also disastrous and led to complete economic failure in sev-
eral Islamic countries. 
                                                          
29 Monica Gaudiosi, “The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development of the Trust in Eng-
land: The Case of Merton College (Oxford), The University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 136, no. 4, 
1988. 
30 Secularism in the sense of freedom of worship constitutes a cardinal principle in the Qur’an. Consider the 
following verses: “To You be your religion and to me mine” (109:9); “If it had been thy Lord’s will, they 
would all have believed, all who are on earth! Will though then compel mankind against their will to be-
lieve?” (10:99); “Let there be no compulsion in religion” (2:256). 
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5. Republicanism. Not accompanied by democracy, republicanism often slid 
into dictatorship. 
At this point we can ask the following: Why was institutional borrowing from 
East to West so beneficial to the borrower (Europe), while the West to East 
borrowing (to the Islamic world) so destructive? Could it be that while the me-
dieval East to West borrowing was done by individuals, primarily merchants, 
from the bottom up, modern West to East borrowing was mostly imposed by 
either the colonial powers or the indigenous modernist elites from top to bot-
tom? There cannot be a straightforward answer to this question as there are im-
portant exceptions. After all, not every post-colonial republic slid into dictator-
ship. Consider, for instance, the case of India – the most populous democracy 
in the world. 
Is the answer then hidden in details or are there deeper and more complex rea-
sons? A more concrete explanation might be found in the deliberate nineteenth 
century destruction of the waqf system by the European colonial powers.31 
Waqfs were the Islamic civil society institutions par excellence and their de-
struction eliminated any potential that might have existed for democracy in the 
Islamic world. 
It is also remarkable that whereas the West reversed its policy and began to 
support charitable foundations in the twentieth century, Muslim modernists re-
mained hostile to waqfs.  
There is also a very real danger of regress: while India is regressing in secular-
ism, Turkey is regressing in democracy. 
What about the post-colonial Islamic world? In general, colonial powers were 
replaced by indigenous dictators often supported by Western powers. Thus, 
strengthened and with only a few exceptions, even the Arab spring failed to get 
rid of these dictators. One thing is very clear, as long as these dictatorships sur-
vive, there is no hope for the Islamic world. Muslims must create a new political 
order. But what kind of a political order? The first thing to remember in this 
                                                          
31 For details see Murat Cizakca, A History of Philanthropic Foundations: Islamic World from the Seventh 
Century to the Present (Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 2000). 
  
44 
context is that the Qur’an does not prescribe a political system. It therefore 
grants considerable freedom to design a system that Muslims can develop in 
response to the demands of the era they live in. While doing this, they can be 
inspired by the classical teachings of their religion.   
Islamic world needs to design new state structures incorporating its own tradi-
tional values and true western achievements such as democracy, rule of law and 
freedoms. Reinterpreting the Maqasid (purposes of Islamic jurisprudence) is an 
important first step. According to Al-Shatibi and Gazali, two great medieval 
Muslim thinkers, there are five major purposes of Islamic jurisprudence: 
1. Protection of the mind 
2. Protection of religion 
3. Protection of property 
4. Protection of the self 
5. Protection of the future generations 
These purposes have been traditionally interpreted mainly as the duty of a Mus-
lim. But Ibn Khaldun considers protecting them is actually the duty of the 
state.32 This is because, he argues, failure to protect them leads to injustice and 
injustice can only be committed by persons who have authority and power and 
therefore “cannot be touched”. Put differently, if any of these purposes is vio-
lated by an ordinary individual, he can be punished and the violation can be 
effectively stopped. But if the violator is the ruler then injustice happens. It is 
therefore the duty of the state, rather than the individual, to protect these pur-
poses. For, the harm that can be done by an individual pale beside the harm that 
can be affected by the state. 
If we follow Ibn Khaldun and consider these purposes as the duty of the state, a 
remarkable re-interpretation becomes possible and they are then transformed 
into the following universal values: 
1. Freedom of thought and expression 
2. Freedom of worship for all (We might call this Islamic secularism) 
                                                          
32 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, an Introduction to History, vol. II, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), p. 107. 
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3. Full property rights for all 
4. Human rights 
Provision of health and education for the future generation through a combina-
tion of voluntary (the waqfs) and state efforts.33 
In short, it is possible to redesign the modern Islamic state with these objectives. 
Not only Islamic law does not constitute any impediment, on the contrary, it 
demands that a modern Islamic state fulfils these duties. It is also clear that dic-
tatorships are incapable of pursuing these goals. So, clearly, the political system 
of a modern Islamic state must be secular and democratic. 
But we must be aware that Islamic secularism is not the same as the French 
laicité. It is rather freedom of worship for all. This is not theoretical, there is 
definitive historical evidence that it was applied by most Islamic states, partic-
ularly by the Ottoman Empire, which developed its much-admired millet system 
for this purpose. But millet system was not a genuine Ottoman invention, it was 
rather an institutionalization of an idea enshrined in the various verses of the 
Qur’an.34 
As for democracy, this is also implied by the Qur’an which ordains Muslims to 
consult. The most efficient method of consulting the masses is democracy with 
its parliament and periodic elections. 
Finally, the economy of such a state should be based upon ethical capitalism. 
This is not just an argument, it is a historical fact. Indeed, ethical capitalism was 
the economic system applied in medieval Islam that enabled Muslims to achieve 
huge wealth.35 
The modern Islamic state should modernize the historical institutions of this 
capitalism. All of this, in my opinion, should be the agenda for Muslims in the 
21st century. What really matters is that these values and institutions are by no 
                                                          
33 M. Çizakça, “Economic Role of the State in Islam”, in M. Kabir Hassan and Mervyn K. Lewis (eds), 
Handbook on Islam and Economic Life (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014). 
34 109:6; 10:99; 2:256 
35 For a detailed analysis of why the medieval Islamic economy was an early form of capitalism see: Murat 
Çizakça, Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution and the Future (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2011). 
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means impeded by Islam, on the contrary, Islam demands that they should be 
firmly established and applied.  
Finally, while doing so, it is essential that the European experience and know-
how should be seriously taken into consideration. This experience and know-
how developed by the Europeans are priceless – they have been learnt at the 
cost of hundreds of millions of Europeans’ lives over the centuries. 
I refer here particularly to the rule of law, democracy and its sub-institutions: 
parliament, separation of powers, independent judiciary and checks and bal-
ances.  
European Union, itself, provides a priceless lesson. While European national-
ism has been so destructive for the Middle East, another Western invention, 
federalism, provides the antidote for it. In short, cross-cultural borrowing of in-
stitutions should continue on the condition that what is borrowed is in harmony 
with the culture, needs and traditions of the borrower. This is supported by re-
search demonstrating that institutional borrowing succeeds only under such 
conditions.36 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
36 Daniel Berkowitz and Katharina Pistor, “Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect”, 
European Economic Review 47, no. 1, 2003: 165-95. 
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The Destruction of the Common Ground  
By Umut Koldaş 
Introduction 
This paper aims to provide an overall analysis of the root causes and dynamics 
of destruction of the common ground in the Mediterranean which prevents an 
enduring cooperation in the regions.  
As the multilevel and multidimensional in-depth analysis of the destruction of 
the ground in the Mediterranean necessitates a systematic analysis and a de-
tailed assessment of the factors and dynamics at various levels of analysis and 
sectors, this presentation mainly aims to put forward the general framework to 
trigger further interdisciplinary discussions. 
Within this framework, the destruction of the common ground will be discussed 
by referring to the root causes of the destruction of the common ground, reasons 
for the continuity of the destruction, and the prospects for a change from de-
struction to reconstruction of the Mediterranean as a common memory space.  
Root Causes of the Destruction of the Common Ground 
Difficulties in constructing a common ground in the Mediterranean mainly de-
rive from unfulfilled basic needs in certain segments of the region, clash of in-
terests and priorities, misguided perceptions about clash of values and value 
systems, lack of institutionalized and functional structure of cooperation and 
dialogue (i.e. failure of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue) and economic benefits of 
continuation of a destroyed common ground for some actors who benefit from 
the existing status quo.  
Security is one of the unfulfilled needs of the individuals and the communities 
in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Sea have not been transformed into a 
sea of peace and cooperation around which a security community would coor-
dinate their joint efforts towards achieving common security goals and priori-
ties. It rather remained as a security complex where competing / conflicting se-
curity priorities interests have suppressed the common ones. 
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Neither regional cooperation efforts such as Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue nor 
the revolutionary movements within the context of Arab Spring resulted in a 
structural change and problem-solving prescriptions towards fulfilling the basic 
security needs of people in the Mediterranean. 
In terms of military security, the Mediterranean was characterized by lingering 
disputes as well as civil wars and wide-spread terrorism all around the region. 
In this respect, military security architecture of the Mediterranean seems to be 
characterized by the short-term military alliances and quick shifts in military 
priorities of the Mediterranean societies in line with the changing security 
agenda. Lack of necessary functioning security structures and instruments for 
multilateral and multi-level management of regional security and inefficiency 
of European and other regional security structures (i.e. WEU, OSCE, NATO, 
Arab League) in providing the region with sustainable security push all relevant 
actors to focus on their own self-fulfilling military security actions rather than 
cooperating with their neighbours. Differences between the security cultures of 
the Mediterranean countries and dissimilarities of their security priorities fur-
ther complicates the possibility of constructing a common ground to fulfil the 
security needs all societies in the Mediterranean region.  
In terms of fulfilling political needs, the Mediterranean societies failed to estab-
lish a common ground for nurturing an all-inclusive regional political culture 
based on co-existence of various patterns of political orientations. Misguided 
attempts to establish a Mediterranean union or national malpractices of exported 
political systems caused constant political instability and uncertainty in certain 
sub-regions of the Mediterranean.  
Outwardly irreconcilable differences in the political priorities and interests of 
various political regimes in different parts of the Mediterranean left the region 
with a scattered regional political framework with mostly disharmonious sub-
regional, national and local political structures/systems.  
Bilateral / regional conflicts were instrumentalized by the domestic political ac-
tors and national political regimes as the tools of regime-consolidation in do-
mestic politics.  In this respect, in certain parts of the region, destroying the 
common ground outside a country or a locality served to consolidate a national 
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and / or sub-national common ground inside that particular entity while harming 
regional harmony. Therefore, political authorities in some of the Mediterranean 
countries tried to increase their domestic political power through fueling the 
foreign animosities / conflicts as well as intrumentalizing national populist dis-
courses against the foreigners in the region. Inability of Mediterranean political 
actors to develop a coherent ideational background of Mediterranean common 
values and tangible mechanisms to materialize a common Mediterranean polit-
ical culture left the radical movements and populist actors room for maneuver 
in the political sphere.  Institutionalization of animosities on political grounds – 
in the body of radical populist / extremist political parties in the North and rad-
ical extremist (even violent) groups in the South and East – further beclouded 
the prospects for constructing a common regional value-system and political 
culture.  
In economic terms, there have been numerous initiatives in order to establish 
common economic for cooperation among the Mediterranean societies through-
out the history. Most recent examples of these initiatives have been preferential 
trade agreements between European Economic Community and the Southern 
Mediterranean countries in 1969, the Global Mediterranean Policy of 1972, 5+5 
Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue created in 1990, The Euro-Mediterranean and the 
Barcelona Process of 1995 efforts towards creation of Euro-Mediterranean free-
trade economic zone, the Agadir Free Trade Agreement among some of the 
Southern Mediterranean countries of 2004 and plans towards establishing Un-
ion for the Mediterranean of 2008. 
Nevertheless, these initiatives could neither prevent deepening of the economic 
developmental gap between the North and South nor have they fulfilled the eco-
nomic promises given to the people of Mediterranean with regard to elimination 
of regional and sub-regional inequalities. In fact, absence of a well-designed 
and an efficient institutional structure to coordinate relations among the Medi-
terranean economies left the people of region with unfulfilled economic needs 
and unmaterialized ideals rather than bringing a more equitable structural trans-
formation.  
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Failure of such initiatives also caused confidence crises, investment problems, 
exploding unemployment and stagnant economies particularly in the South 
Mediterranean particularly after 2008 economic crisis. This situation was fur-
ther exacerbated by political instability and structural deconstruction of the po-
litical regimes following the Arab Spring. The civil wars, terrorist attacks and 
other types of military confrontations led emergence of economies of conflict, 
which did not allow construction of a smooth functioning regional economic 
cooperation. As a result, the economy appeared as an area of competition and 
protection rather than cooperation in the years of regional neoliberal restructur-
ing. In this respect, it is not clear yet whether even the newly found energy 
sources in the Mediterranean will be a catalyst for solution the conflicts or will 
they create new conflicts among the Mediterranean countries. 
In societal terms, the main question about establishing a common ground is to 
maintain harmonious coexistence of the different cultures and identities in the 
Mediterranean. Existence of various religious, linguistic and ethnic groups is 
supposed to be richness of the region. Differences among these group of people 
however, is exploited by the conflict driven entities in order to achieve certain 
political objectives. Benefiting politically from discourses of inter-ethnic, inter-
religious and / or inter-cultural otherization and xenophobia some radical move-
ments fuel the conflicts among the peoples of the Mediterranean. Therefore, 
differences in cultures have been instrumentalized as reference points for intra-
regional conflicts rather than being considered as richness of the region to con-
struct a basis for a solid cultural common ground. Rising discourse on clashes 
of cultural values and polarized identities ingenerate protectionist nationalism 
and xenophobic populism, which make construction of a cultural common 
ground more difficult. Another dynamic which further postpones building of a 
cultural common ground is the internalization / banalization of identity driven 
intra-regional conflicts by the sides of the conflicts as well as by the local, re-
gional and global actors. Continuation of daily life routines and practices within 
the context of these conflicts (such as Cyprus Conflict or Arab-Israeli Conflict) 
allow the peoples of Mediterranean to get used to live with the conflict (like a 
tumour in the body where you know it is there but you get along with it). Such 
an adaptation conflict also brings about de-prioritization of lingering conflicts 
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in the international, regional and local agenda unless it evolves into actual 
clashes. 
Destruction of common grounds in cultural terms does not only occur among 
the individuals but also in the spatial domains of Mediterranean. Destruction of 
the spatial common grounds takes place mainly through historical deconstruc-
tion (i.e. renaming the villages, reorganizing the space) and an ahistorical re-
construction of the identity of space by erasing the symbols of coexistence or 
replacing them with the new ones and banal reproduction of new meanings of 
the space on daily basis by decontextualizing it from its historical background. 
Decontextualizing the spatial history of the villages in Cyprus or Arab-Israeli 
Conflict are the most obvious examples of such reconstruction. The checkpoints 
in Israel and Cyprus, on the other hand, continue to serve as the means for banal 
reproduction of dividedness. In fact, the pragmatic use of the spatial dividedness 
by the sides of the conflict in their daily lives further cements banal reproduction 
of a destroyed common ground. As the people adapt themselves to the division 
and explore the daily benefits / advantages of spatial dividedness, this results in 
false-conscious acceptance and continuous reproduction of dividedness. 
Unfulfilled Promises: Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and Mediterranean 
Union 
As mentioned above inability to establish necessary institutions and generate 
effective policies at regional level to cope with the problems of the Mediterra-
nean, prevents to materialize systematic efforts against destruction of the com-
mon grounds.  
Regional initiatives of institutionalization such as Euro-Mediterranean Dia-
logue and Mediterranean Union failed to fulfil their promises to the peoples of 
the Mediterranean.  In the case of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and Mediterra-
nean Union the main promise was freedom from military, economic, political, 
societal and environmental insecurity and end of fear. This promise, as well as 
the security needs of the people, has never been fulfilled. 
Mediterranean Union or Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue remained as idle elite 
projects which did not fulfil the very basic tangible and intangible needs of the 
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people. They turned into simply top to bottom projects which were not very well 
known to general public and thus were not internalized by the people on the 
street. People of the Mediterranean could not simply understand how being 
“Mediterranean” or sharing the common values would solve their problems. In 
this respect, while the “Mediterranean-ness” offered the Mediterranean people 
unfulfilled promises, its opponent ideologies pledged to fulfil their needs not 
only on the physical world but also in the spiritual one (i.e. Jihadism). 
Unfulfilled Promises: Arab Spring 
The needs were misperceived and misread by the political and intellectual elite 
both in the region and the world consciously or unconsciously within the con-
text of Arab upheavals that took place after 2011. Arab Spring was an oppor-
tunity to create a Mediterranean solidarity for the transformation but it was not 
used. It resulted in the re-imprisonment of the people in the new authoritarian 
structure. In fact, it was also a case of misreading or de-contextualizing the 
needs of the people. 
Mohammed Bouazisi, the street vendor in Tunisia did not burn himself for the 
democratic values or for Mediterranean Unity (or Victory of Islam or for any 
other so called higher common values). He burned himself because his and his 
beloveds’ basic needs of being human were not fulfilled.  It was not only the 
material needs but also the needs related to the human dignity (the way how he 
was treated by the authorities). 
Arab Spring could have been the beginning of so-called structural transfor-
mation in the Mediterranean authoritarian regimes. However, it lacked a very 
well-structured Euro-Mediterranean solidarity. Being Mediterranean did not 
help the regimes in transformation to fulfil the needs of the societies.  
Unfinished transformations resulted in replacement of the authoritarian regimes 
with new authoritarian regimes or entities. The promises of Arab Spring for 
democracy, welfare and accountability has been overturned country after coun-
try: Today we have new forms of authoritarianism in Egypt, civil war and au-
thoritarian Jihadism in Syria, chaos in Libya, and terrorism all over the Medi-
terranean. 
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Thousands of people with unfulfilled material and spiritual needs have left their 
homes to join the radical movements, in the middle of the social protests over 
rising unemployment, corruption, prominent terrorist attacks and lingering in-
surgency in their countries. This, once again showed us that we cannot simply 
speak about the values to people whose basic material and spiritual needs were 
not fulfilled. 
However, we can and should talk about these common values while fulfilling 
these needs. If the people can see that being Mediterranean and sharing the same 
values solve their problems and fulfil their needs, then it would be much easier 
to internalize these values. 
Unfulfilled Promises: Refugee Crisis 
Recent refugee crisis has been another test case for the solidarity of “Mediter-
ranean-ness”, which most of the Mediterranean societies failed to provide sup-
port their region-mates in fulfilling their very basic needs for survival.  
In this picture, one cannot simply convince the people about the sincerity of 
Mediterranean solidarity, unity or commonalities while closing the doors for the 
forcefully displaced people and avoiding to fulfil the basic needs of the Medi-
terranean people from Syria and other conflict-torn Mediterranean countries. 
We need to emphasize the Mediterranean commonalities, common values while 
solving the very basic problems of the people with showing respect to their dig-
nity rather than seeing this help as a self-satisfactory process in domestic, re-
gional and international arena. 
As a Conclusion:  Future of the Mediterranean from an age of uncertainty 
to ???? 
Mediterranean can be considered as a centre, a bridge or crossroads that unify 
or integrate the people. It can well serve as a frontier, a wall or a buffer zone 
that divide them.  
Today we have to deal with very serious challenges to establish a Mediterranean 
common ground such as deepening of the processes of otherization; rise of new 
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wave of populism based on nationalist (even racist)-protectionism; continuing 
griefs of the people of the region dues to civil wars, forced displacements; lin-
gering disputes; terrorism; violent populism, and xenophobia.   
People of the Mediterranean and the world should decide on what direction will 
they choice to move forward. The choice will be between establishing effective 
mechanisms to fulfil the needs of the Mediterranean people and a self-fulfilling 
hypocrisy that would turn ideals of Mediterranean solidarity and union into 
empty promises reflected in the fancy speeches of regional and global political 
leaders. 
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Space: Delegates’ List   
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Dimitrios P. Droutsas (Former Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Greece) 
Ellada Evangelou (Researcher / Community Worker in Culture – University of 
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Nada Farah (Project Manager at Ettijahat – Independent Culture, Lebanon)  
Henrietta Goelet (John Goelet Foundation, USA) 
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John Goelet (Farmer / Entrepreneur, USA) 
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Sarrah Kassem (Ph.D. Student, University of Tübingen, Germany) 
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ing Centre, Lebanon / Roberto Cimetta Fund, France) 
Dr. Umut Koldaş (Director of the Near East Institute of the Near East Univer-
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Dr. Nora Lafi (Senior Researcher (Historian) at Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner 
Orient (ZMO) Berlin, Germany) 
Paul Lassus (Lawyer, Paris Bar, France) 
Anna Manice (Co-Founder and President, Lazord Foundation, USA) 
Henry Manice (Entrepreneur, USA) 
Aristea Plevri (Deputy Mayor for Culture, Heraklion)  
Ferdinand Richard (President of the Roberto Cimetta Fund, France)  
Prof. Dr. Caroline Y. Robertson-von-Trotha (ZAK | Centre for Cultural and 
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Pierantonio Rumignani (Economist, Germany) 
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Fides Sachs (Project Manager, Maecenata Foundation, Germany)  
Orhan Silier (Historian, Turkey) 
Dimitris Stefanakis (Author, Greece) 
Prof. Dr. Udo Steinbach (Director of the Governance Center Middle East | 
North Africa / Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform, Germany) 
Dr. Rupert Graf Strachwitz (Executive Director of the Maecenata Foundation, 
Germany) 
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